An overview of Generalised Veltman Semantics by Joosten, Joost J. et al.
An overview of Generalised Veltman Semantics
Joost J. Joosten, Jan Mas Rovira, Luka Mikec, Mladen Vukovic´
July 10, 2020
Abstract
Interpretability logics are endowed with relational semantics a` la Kripke:
Veltman semantics. For certain applications though, this semantics is not
fine-grained enough. Back in 1992 the notion of generalised Veltman se-
mantics emerged to obtain certain non-derivability results as was first
presented by Verbrugge ([76]). It has turned out that this semantics has
various good properties. In particular, in many cases completeness proofs
become simpler and the richer semantics will allow for filtration argu-
ments as opposed to regular Veltman semantics. This paper aims to give
an overview of results and applications of Generalised Veltman semantics
up to the current date.
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with interpretability logics and a particular kind of relational
semantics for them. In the literature we find interpretability logics that are
propositional modal logics with a unary modality 2 for formal provability and
a binary modality  used to denote formal interpretability or some related
(meta)mathematical notion like, for example, conservativity. As such, inter-
pretability logics extend the well-known provability logic GL. In particular,
Kripke semantics for GL can be extended to account for the new binary inter-
pretability operator . Such an extension was first considered by Frank Veltman
and now goes by the name of Veltman semantics.
Unary modal logics allow for other abstract semantics like topological or
neighbourhood semantics which can be seen as generalisations of the regular
Kripke semantics. Although these kind of semantics have not yet been studied
for interpretability logics, there is some sort of hybrid generalisation which is
called Generalised Veltman Semantics, GVS for short. GVS was first introduced
and studied by Verbrugge in [76]. In GVS the 2 modality is dealt with as before
and only the  semantics is generalised in a way reminiscent to neighbourhood
semantics.
GVS is more fine-grained than regular Veltman semantics and as such can
serve the purpose of distinguishing logical axiom schemes. However, the most
important contribution of GVS to the field of interpretability logics lies in the
fact that it allows for filtration in various systems, contrary to regular Veltman
semantics. This has resulted in a situation where certain logics are known to
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be complete w.r.t. GVS but known to be incomplete with respect to regular
Veltman semantics. In other cases, the only known way of showing decidability
of a logic runs via GVS. Thus, GVS is proving itself an important tool in the
study of interpretability logics. Moreover, completeness proof for GVS often
turn out to be more uniform and simple than in the case of regular Veltman
semantics as one can appreciate in Sections 5 and 6 of this paper.
In the remainder of the paper we will give an overview of the uses and occur-
rences of GVS. Before doing so, we finish this introduction by briefly outlining
the general development of interpretability logics and the role of GVS therein.
The main point of the remainder of this introduction is to show that the field of
interpretability logics has grown to a mature state having various applications
and relations to other fields of logic and we do not claim to give an exhaustive
overview.
1.1 The beginnings
An interpretation of a theory V into a theory U is roughly a translation j that
maps the non-logical symbols in the language of V to formulas in the language
of U with exactly the same free variables, so that any theorem ϕ of V will
become provable in U too when we apply the translation j to it. Various kinds
of interpretations are around in the literature and interpretations are used in
practically all branches of mathematics or meta-mathematics though a first
methodological treatment is presented in [75]. We are not too much interested
in the variations and uses of interpretations and refer the interested reader
to [82, 40]. Rather, we shall focus on the logics that describe the structural
behaviour of the interpretability notion.
Interpretability logics arose in the eighties/nineties of the last century around
Petr Ha´jek, Dick de Jongh, Franco Montagna, Vı´teˇzlav Sˇvejdar, Frank Veltman
and Albert Visser. Just like provability logic describes the provably structural
behaviour of the formalised provability predicate, the aim was to find a logic
that describes exactly all provably structural behaviour of the notion of inter-
pretability.
Probably the first published conception of interpretability as a modal opera-
tor is Sˇvejdar’s [73] from1 1983. Montagna took this project further in his paper
[62] of 1987. However, it was not until 1990 when Visser conceived the modal
logical framework proposing various principles and axiom schemes ([79, 80]) in
the format we know today giving rise to the basic interpretability logic IL. Se-
mantics for these systems was provided by Veltman and de Jongh who proved
completeness ([17]) in 1990 for the logics IL, and the extensions ILP and ILM.
Ever since, the field of interpretability logics knows various different logics
and has seen a development into quite a mature field interacting with various
other branches of logic and mathematics. We shall now mention a few of the
1We refer in this introduction to the year of publication while often preprints already
circulated prior to that.
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most notable developments. Below we shall mention various systems of inter-
pretability logic, the definitions of which shall be postponed to later sections.
1.2 Relation to meta-mathematics
Various logics akin to IL are known to adequately describe well-delimited parts
of meta-mathematics lending much importance and applicability to these logics.
The first completeness result arose when Visser proved ([80], [91]) arithmetical
completeness for the logic ILP for any Σ1 sound, finitely axiomatisable theory
where the superexponential function is provably total.
Any Σ1-sound theory containing a minimum of arithmetic (I∆0 + exp ) will
have the same provability logic GL ([14]). The situation for interpretability
is very different. Shavrukov ([69]) and independently Berarducci ([5]), estab-
lished that the logic ILM generates precisely the set of interpretability principles
that are always provable2 in theories like PA (being Σ1 sound and having full
induction/proving consistency of any of its finite subsystems).
Since different kinds of theories have different kind of interpretability logics, a
major question in the field revolves about the logic that generates the collection
of principles that is always provable in any reasonable arithmetical theory. Here
the quantifier “any” is left vague on purpose but can be taken to be any theory
containing I∆0 + exp . The target logic is denoted IL(All) and even though
much progress has been achieved [48, 21, 27, 42, 43, 29] on the question, its exact
nature is still a major open problem. Given the plethora of recent principles
it is quite conceivable that a natural answer to this question will require an
extension of the language as in [49, 47].
Basically, for any theory that is neither essentially reflexive nor finitely ax-
iomatisable and proving the totality of the superexponentiation function, the
corresponding interpretability logic is unknown. Some very modest progress is
presented on the interpretability logic of PRA ([9, 44, 45, 36]). Kalsbeek has
published some notes ([50]) on the interpretability logic of I∆0 + exp and prob-
ably that is about how much is known about interpretability logics for theories
that fall out of the two kinds mentioned above.
Interpretability logics are also good for describing (meta-)mathematical phe-
nomena other than or variations of interpretability. Without giving the defini-
tions, we mention that propositional modal logics similar to the logics mentioned
above with the modalities {2,}, occur when axiomatising phenomena like par-
tial conservativity ([65, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 46, 38]), cointerpretability, tolerance
and cotolerance ([22, 23, 40]), Σ1-interpolability ([39]), constructive preservativ-
ity ([37]), intuitionistic interpretability ([55, 53, 54]) and feasible interpretability
([78]).
2The way to go from always provable to always true is done as always by adding reflection
over the set of theorems. See [71] for a slight generalisation.
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1.3 Abstract semantics
Even though interpretability has been studied from a perspective of categories
([84]) and degrees ([72, 63, 2, 52, 83, 85]) in quite some depth, no abstract alge-
braic, nor topological semantics for interpretability logics have been studied or
designed yet. However, apart from the above-mentioned arithmetical semantics,
interpretability logics and its kin come with natural relational semantics. This
relational so-called Veltman semantics has seen a considerable development over
the past decades.
Completeness proofs and decidability results for various logics abounded
since de Jongh and Veltman’s first results ([17]) using a kind of semi-canonical
model definition to deal with the logics IL, ILM and ILP. Further completeness
results yielded ever more complicated proofs culminating in a completeness proof
of ILW in [18].
New model-theoretical techniques were needed to address other systems like
the step-by-step method3 ([18, 26, 42]) for logics as ILM0 and ILW
∗ and assuring
labels for substantial simplifications of general proofs but most notably ILW
([8, 25]).
Various other logics resisted completeness proofs for Veltman semantics and
actually many turned out to be incomplete. Here the technique of generalised
Veltman semantics came to the rescue which is the main topic of this paper.
Recently, also subsystems of IL are being studied where the relational semantics
again turn out to be adequate [51].
The notion of bisimulation could be applied to both Veltman semantics [80]
and GVS [86]. Furthermore, in [11], Cˇacˇic´ and Vrgocˇ defined the notion of a
game for Veltman models and proved that a winning strategy for the defender
in such a game is equivalent to picking out a bisimulation between two models.
In various occasions, results using modal model techniques could be trans-
lated back to arithmetic results like in the case of self provers and Σ1 sentences
([15, 28]) and the fixpoint theorem [17] and [20].
3These step-by-step methods were around and entering main-stream modal-logical litera-
ture since the seventies. They were coined as such in [7] but before that also went by different
names as Completeness by construction in a reader from de Jongh and Veltman from the
eighties [16]. The first time the step-by-step method was applied to interpretability logics
however, are the completeness proofs for ILW by de Jongh and Veltman ([18]) and complete-
ness proofs for ILM and ILM0 by Joosten ([42]) with later a corrected proof for ILM0 by Goris
and Joosten in [26]. Joosten wrote his master thesis under direction of de Jongh and Visser.
De Jongh suggested a variation of the step-by-step method so that we would work with infinite
maximal consistent sets but only using finitely many of those to build models. In the context
of this historic digression it is good to mention Verbrugge’s master thesis [77] under direction
of de Jongh and Visser where she proves completeness w.r.t. so-called umbelliferous frames
using a step-by-step method via the intersection of infinite maximal consistent sets with a
finite fragment for a logic Umb which contains modalities for provability, interpretability and
witness comparisons as in Sˇvejdar’s [73].
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1.4 Decidability and complexity
For many interpretability logics, decidability follows directly from their modal
completeness proofs and the finite model property (FMP). This is the case for
IL, ILW, ILP, and ILM. For other logics, completeness was obtained with the
help of constructions that avoid finite (truncated) maximal consistent sets [26],
[61]. In such cases it is not obvious how to make the constructions finite. Here,
the method of filtration has proven useful. However, up to today, we only know
how to perform filtration for GVS and not for regular Veltman semantics. The
decidability of the logics ILM0 [67], ILW
∗ [60], ILP0 and ILR [61] has been
shown using these methods. In all these cases finite models are obtained as
quotient models w.r.t. the largest bisimulation of the given generalised Veltman
model. At the time of writing, there is no known example of a complete and
undecidable logic.
For a long time nothing non-trivial was known regarding complexity of in-
terpretability logics. The first result concerning complexity was that already
the closed fragment of IL, unlike the closed fragment of GL, is PSPACE-hard
[6]. The only other published result is that IL is PSPACE-complete [59]. The
third author believes to have shown that ILP and ILW are PSPACE-complete
too, and hopes to do the same with ILM (the proof for which turns out to be
significantly harder to complete than expected).
1.5 Many classical results carry over to interpretability
logics
A clear signal of working with the right notion and framework is seen in the
fact that various classical results find their analogs in our logics. We already
mentioned the Fixpoint Theorem and will in this paragraph mention some others
without pretending to give an exhaustive overview.
Areces, Hoogland, and de Jongh in [1] proved that arrow interpolation holds
for IL, i.e. if `IL A→ B then there is a formula I in the common language of A
and B such that `IL A→ I and `IL I → B. As corollaries one obtains turnstile
interpolation (i.e. if A `IL B then there is a formula I in common language such
that A `IL I and I `IL B) and -interpolation (i.e. if `IL A B then there is
a formula I in common language such that `IL A I and `IL I B ). In [1] it
is also shown that all these properties transfer to the system ILP.
It is proven that the system ILW doesn’t have the property of arrow inter-
polation. Visser [82] proved that systems between ILM0 and ILM do not have
interpolation either, although this can be restored by enriching the language
(see [24]). The interpolation property for the system ILF is an open problem.
For all provability and interpretability logics it is shown in [1] that the Beth
definability property and fixed points property are interderivable. This implies
that all extensions of the basic system of provability logic GL and all extensions
of IL have the Beth property.
Perkov and Vukovic´ [66] proved a version of van Benthem’s characterisation
theorem (see [3]) for interpretability logic. A first-order formula is equivalent
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to the standard first-order translation of some formula of interpretability logic
with respect to Veltman models if and only if it is invariant under bisimula-
tions between Veltman models. To prove this, they used bisimulation games
on Veltman models. They provide characteristic formulas which formalise the
existence of winning strategies for the defender in finite bisimulation games.
Ha´jek and Sˇvejdar [34] determined normal forms for the closed fragment of
the system ILF, and showed that we can eliminate the modal operator  from
closed IL-formulas. The normal form for the closed fragment of IL is unlikely
to have a nice solution given the PSPACE completeness. However, Cˇacˇic´ and
Vukovic´ [12] proved normal forms exist for a wide class of closed IL formulas.
Cˇacˇic´ and Kovacˇ [10] quantified asymptotically, in exact numbers, how wide
those classes are using results from combinatorics and asymptotic analysis.
1.6 Proof theory
To the best of our knowledge, very few well-behaved proof systems for inter-
pretability logics have been studied. Sasaki [68] gave a cut-free sequent system
for IL and prove a cut-elimination theorem for it. Hakoniemi and Joosten [35]
give a treatment of labelled tableaux proof systems and uniformly prove com-
pleteness for any logic whose frame condition is given by a Horn formula.
2 Logics for interpretability
In this section we shall lay down the basic definitions.
2.1 Modal interpretability logics
In interpretability logics, we adopt a reading convention due to Dick de Jongh
that will allow us to omit many brackets. As such, we say that the strongest
binding ‘connectives’ are ¬, 2 and 3 which all bind equally strong. Next come
∧ and ∨, followed by  and the weakest connective is →. Thus, for example,
AB → A∧2CB∧2C will be short for (AB)→ ((A∧2C) (B∧2C)).
We first define the core logic IL which shall be present in any other inter-
pretability logic. As before, we work in a propositional signature where apart
from the classical connectives we have a unary modal operator 2 and a binary
modal operator .
Definition 2.1. The logic IL contains apart from all propositional logical tau-
tologies, all instantiations of the following axiom schemes:
L1 2(A→ B)→ (2A→ 2B)
L2 2A→ 22A
L3 2(2A→ A)→ 2A
J1 2(A→ B)→ AB
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J2 (AB) ∧ (B  C)→ A C
J3 (A C) ∧ (B  C)→ A ∨B  C
J4 AB → (3A→ 3B)
J5 3AA
The rules of the logic are Modus Ponens (from ` A→ B and ` A, conclude
` B) and Necessitation (from ` A conclude ` 2A).
Since 2 denotes provability and  denotes interpretability –a base theory
together with the left-hand formula interprets the same base theory together
with the right-hand formula– we can already see what the J-principles above
express. Thus, Principle J1 expresses that the identity translation defines an
interpretation. Principle J2 expresses that one can compose interpretations by
applying one translation after another. Principle J3 is sometimes referred to as
Ha´jek’s principle reflecting so-called Ha´jek’s Theorem4 about constructing an
interpretation by cases. Principle J4 reflects that an interpretation gives rise
to relative consistency. Finally, J5 reflects that one can perform the Henkin
construction in arithmetic so that consistency provides an inner model from
which an interpretation can be distilled.
2.2 Arithmetical semantics
Interpretability logics are related to arithmetics in very much the same way as
provability logics are. Thus, we define an arithmetical realisation ∗ as a map
that takes propositional variables to sentences in the language of arithmetic5.
The realisation is extended to act on arbitrary modal formulas by preserving the
logical structure thus commuting with the Boolean connectives. The modality 2
is mapped to an arithmetisation of “is provable in the base theory T” for some
fixed base theory T and likewise will  be mapped to an arithmetisation of
interpretability. The interpretability logic of a theory T is now defined as usual
being the set of modal formulas whose realisation is provable in T regardless on
the exact nature of the realisation:
Definition 2.2. Let T be a theory in the language of arithmetic that is strong
enough to allow for a proper treatment of formalised syntax. We define the
interpretability logic of T as
IL(T) := {ϕ | ∀ ∗ T ` ϕ∗}.
Even though the notion of formalised interpretability is Σ03-complete ([70]),
for two classes of theories we have an elegant and decidable characterisation for
4We thank Vitek Sˇvejdar for pointing this out to us.
5We assume that all our theories contain the language of arithmetic in one way or another.
We refer the reader to [40] for details of this and our Definition 2.2
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the corresponding interpretability logic. We call a theory T Σ1-sound if it only
proves true Σ1-sentences.
By ILM we denote the logic that arises by adding Montagna’s axiom scheme
M := AB → A ∧2C B ∧2C
to IL.
Theorem 2.3 (Berarducci [5], Shavrukov6 [69]). If T is Σ1-sound and proves
full induction, then IL(T) = ILM.
The logic ILP arises by adding the axiom scheme
P := AB → 2(AB)
to the basic logic IL. The logic ILP is related to finitely axiomatised theories
that can prove the totality of supexp, where supexp(x) is defined as x 7→ 2xx
with 2n0 := n and 2
n
m+1 := 2
(2nm).
Theorem 2.4 (Visser [80]). If T is Σ1-sound, finitely axiomatised and proves
the totality of supexp, then IL(T) = ILP.
Since ILM 6= ILP it is very natural to ask for the core logic that is contained
in the interpretability logic of any (strong enough) theory. This results in an
additional quantifier in the definition of what is often called the interpretability
logic of all reasonable arithmetical theories:
Definition 2.5.
IL(All) := {ϕ | ∀T ⊇ I∆0 + exp ∀ ∗ T ` ϕ∗}.
Since it is well known and easy to see that all theorems of IL hold in any
strong enough arithmetical theory, by the above two theorems we obtain that
IL ⊆ IL(All) ⊆ (ILP∩ILM). As to date, a modal characterisation of IL(All) is
unknown. Most principles in this paper have been considered because of their
relation to IL(All).
2.3 Relational semantics
We can equip interpretability logics with a natural relational semantics often
referred to as Veltman semantics.
6Shavrukov’s arithmetical completeness proof is dated 1988 which is before the official
publication of the modal completeness proof of de Jongh and Veltman [17] and Visser’s sim-
plification thereof using a single accessibility relation S to model the modality [79]. However,
these results were already available in preprint form as D.H.J. de Jongh, F.J.M.M. Veltman.
Provability logics for relative interpretability. ITLI Prepublication Series ML-88-03 (1988);
and A. Visser. Preliminary notes on interpretability logic. Logic Group Preprint Series
No.29 (1988); respectively.
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Definition 2.6. A Veltman frame is a triple 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}〉 where W
is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R a binary relation on W so that R−1
is transitive and well-founded. The {Sw : w ∈ W} is a collection of binary
relations on R[w] (where R[w] := {v | wRv}). The requirements are that the
Sw are reflexive and transitive and the restriction of R to R[w] is contained in
Sw, that is R ∩R[w] ⊆ Sw.
A Veltman model consists of a Veltman frame together with a valuation
V : Prop → P(W ) that assigns to each propositional variable p ∈ Prop a set
of worlds V (p) in W where p is stipulated to be true. This valuation defines
a forcing relation  ⊆ W×Form telling us which formulas are true at which
particular world:
w  p :⇔ w ∈ V (p);
w  ⊥ for no w ∈W ;
w  A→ B :⇔ w 1 A or w  B;
w  2A :⇔ ∀v (wRv ⇒ v  A);
w  AB :⇔ ∀u (wRu & u  A⇒ ∃v (uSwv & v  B)).
For a Veltman model M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}, V 〉, we shall write M |= A as
short for (∀w ∈W ) M, w  A.
De Jongh and Veltman proved that the logic IL is sound and complete with
respect to all Veltman models ([17]).
Often one is interested in considering all models that can be defined over
a frame. Thus, given a frame F and a valuation V on F we shall denote the
corresponding model by 〈F, V 〉. A frame condition for an axiom scheme A is a
formula (A) (first or higher-order) in the language {R, {Sw : w ∈ W}} so that
F |= (A) (as a relational structure) if and only if ∀valuationV 〈F, V 〉 |= A.
3 Generalised Veltman Semantics
For certain purposes, Veltman semantics is not fine-grained enough. Generalised
semantics was originally introduced by Verbrugge [76] in 1992 to determine
independence between certain interpretability logics as we shall discuss in the
next section.
3.1 Replacing worlds by sets of worlds
The idea of generalised Veltman semantics is that we will use sets to model the modality. To be more precise, instead of having the Sw be a relation between
worlds, we will use a relation between worlds and sets of worlds. Thus, we would
have things like uSwV where V is a set of worlds. The forcing relation would
be defined accordingly:
w  AB :⇔ ∀u(wRu & u  A⇒ ∃V (uSwV & V  B)),
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where V  B is short for (∀ v∈V )v  B.
In doing so, the axiom scheme AB → (3A→ 3B) imposes7 that all of V
should be R-above w. The axiom scheme 2(A→ B)→ AB requires that the
Sw relation is what we call semi-reflexive in the sense that uSw{u} whenever
wRu. The axiom scheme 3AA imposes that whenever wRuRv, then uSw{v}.
Just like in regular Veltman semantics, the axiom scheme (AC)∧ (BC)→
A ∨B C does not impose any requirement on generalised Veltman semantics
and is satisfied automatically. It turns out that there is quite some freedom in
how to account for the axiom scheme (A  B) ∧ (B  C) → A  C. One such
choice is the predominant one in the literature and we shall give it here and
fix it for the remainder of this paper. The definition was already given in the
original document [76] by Verbrugge. Variations will be discussed in the next
subsection.
Definition 3.1. A generalised Veltman frame F is a structure 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈
W}〉, where W is a non-empty set, R is a transitive and converse well-founded
binary relation on W and for all w ∈W we have:
a) Sw ⊆ R[w]× (P(R[w]) \ {∅});
b) Sw is quasi-reflexive: wRu implies uSw{u};
c) Sw is quasi-transitive: if uSwV and vSwZv for all v ∈ V , then
uSw(
⋃
v∈V Zv);
d) if wRuRv, then uSw{v};
e) monotonicity: if uSwV and V ⊆ Z ⊆ R[w], then uSwZ.
A generalised Veltman model is a quadruple M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}, V 〉,
where the first three components form a generalised Veltman frame and where
V is a valuation mapping propositional variables to subsets of W . The forcing
relation M, w  A is defined as before in Definition 2.6 with the sole difference
that now
w  AB :⇐⇒ ∀u (wRu & u  A⇒ ∃V (uSwV & V  B)).
It is easy to see that GVS is adequate for IL:
Theorem 3.2. The logic IL is sound and complete w.r.t. GVS.
Proof. Soundness follows from an easy check on the rules and all the axiom
schemes. For completeness we reason as follows. Suppose IL 0 A. By using
de Jongh and Veltman’s theorem from [17] we get a (regular) Veltman model
M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}, V 〉 and world x ∈W so that M, x  ¬A.
We now transform M into a generalised Veltman model M′ by only changing
the Sw relations so that M
′ = 〈W,R, {S′w : w ∈W}, V 〉 and8
uS′wV :⇔ ∃ v∈V uSwv.
7See [51] for a more detailed discussion.
8We would like to emphasise that we use the letter V to denote both the valuation and a
subset of W. In the following text, we will do this again several times.
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It will be clear from the context what the letter V means.
Quasi-transitivity requires a small argument but it is easy to see that this
definition of S′ yields a generalised Veltman model. Furthermore, via an easy
induction we can prove that for any formula B and any w ∈W we have M, w 
B ⇔M′, w  B. In particular M′, x  ¬A which completes the proof.
The above proof tells us that any Veltman model can be transformed into
a generalised Veltman model preserving truth. Verbrugge has proven that in
certain cases, one can also go the other way around and we will discuss this in
Subsection 3.3.
3.2 On quasi-transitivity
As we mentioned before, there are quite some alternatives to a semantic require-
ment of the transitivity axiom scheme (A  B) ∧ (B  C) → A  C. We will
now discuss some of them. In the next table, we should bear in mind that if we
have uSxV for some u, x and V , then this automatically implies that V 6= ∅.
Nr. Semantic requirement for transitivity First mentioned in
(1) uSxY ⇒ ∀{Yy}y∈Y
(
(∀ y ∈ Y ySxYy)⇒ ∃Z ⊆
⋃
y∈Y Yy uSxZ
)
This paper
(2) uSxY ⇒ ∀{Yy}y∈Y
(
(∀ y ∈ Y ySxYy)⇒ uSx
⋃
y∈Y Yy
)
Verbrugge ’92 [76]
(3) uSxY ⇒ ∃ y ∈ Y ∀Y ′(ySxY ′ ⇒ ∃Y ′′⊆Y ′ uSxY ′′) This paper
(4) uSxY ⇒ ∃ y ∈ Y ∀Y ′(ySxY ′ ⇒ uSxY ′) Joosten ’98 [42]
(5) uSxY ⇒ ∀ y ∈ Y ∀Y ′(ySxY ′ ⇒ ∃Y ′′⊆Y ′ uSxY ′′) This paper
(6) uSxY ⇒ ∀ y ∈ Y ∀Y ′(ySxY ′ ⇒ uSxY ′) Verbrugge ’92 [76]
(7) uSxY ⇒ ∀ y ∈ Y ∀Y ′(ySxY ′ & y /∈ Y ′ ⇒ ∃Y ′′⊆Y ′ uSxY ′′) This paper
(8) uSxY ⇒ ∀ y ∈ Y ∀Y ′(ySxY ′ & y /∈ Y ′ ⇒ uSxY ′) Goris, Joosten ’09 [27]
Table 1: Semantic conditions for quasi-transitivity mentioned in the literature.
All of the presented quasi-transitivity requirements are adequate for proving
IL soundness and completeness. For soundness it is routine to check that every
instantiation of J2 holds. For the completeness part it is enough to see that
any ordinary Veltman model M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}, V 〉 can be transformed
into a generalised Veltman model M′ = 〈W,R, {S′w : w ∈ W}, V 〉 where for all
w ∈ W we have S′w := {〈x, {y}〉 : 〈x, y〉 ∈ Sw} and see9 that M′ has the same
associated forcing relation as M. These properties have been verified in the
proof assistant Agda and are presented with more detail in [57].
Agda ([64]) is a proof assistant based on a constructive type theory with
dependent types that allows the paradigm of propositions as types ([90]) via the
Curry-Howard correspondence.
The following theorem tells us why Notion (2) is in a sense the more natural
one.
9The argument works in virtue that in (1) and (2) we understand that each y has a single
Yy and would break down in case we allowed for various Y
(α)
y (yielding yet another semantic
variation).
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Theorem 3.3. Let F = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}〉 be a generalised Veltman frame
satisfying quasi-transitivity Condition (i) ∈ {1, . . . , 8}. Let F′ = 〈W,R, {S′w :
w ∈W}〉 where for all w ∈W we define S′w as the monotone closure of Sw:
S′w := {〈x, Y ′〉 : 〈x, Y 〉 ∈ Sw, Y ⊆ Y ′ ⊆ R[w]}.
Then F′ is a generalised Veltman frame satisfying quasi-transitivity Condition
(2). Furthermore for any formula A and valuation V with M := 〈F, V 〉 and
M′ := 〈F′, V 〉 we have that
M, w  A if and only if M′, w  A .
Proof. Details are presented in [57].
As we see in Theorem 3.3 taking the monotone closure of each Sw does not
change the forcing relation and the resulting frame satisfies quasi-transitivity
Condition (2).
Note that taking the monotone closure of each Sw is essentially different than
assuming that each Sw is monotone by definition, as then the forcing relation
may change. In the following example we present a generalised Veltman model
with Condition (8) that showcases such behaviour.
Figure 1: Example frame: wRv0, wRv1, wRv2, wRv3, v0Sw{v1}, v2Sw{v3}.
Let M be a model based on the frame displayed in Figure 1 such that V (p) =
{v0} and V (q) = {v2} (i.e. {x : x  p} = {v0}, {x : x  q} = {v2}). We see that
w  ¬(p q) as p is only true in v0 and we only have v0Sw{v1} with v1 1 q. If
we assume that the relation Sw is monotone then we have v0Sw{v1, v2} and by
quasi-transitivity (8) we get v0Sw{v3}. Consequently w  ¬(p q) is no longer
true.
3.3 Veltmans semantics versus GVS
The completeness proof of GVS (Theorem 3.2) tells us that any Veltman model
can be transformed into a generalised Veltman model preserving truth. Ver-
brugge has proven that one can also go the other way around for quasi-transitivity
Notion 6 from Table 1. Below we write  and ′ instead of V and V ′ and their
respective extensions.
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Theorem 3.4. (Verbrugge [76]) Let 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}, V 〉 be a generalised
Veltman model with quasi-transitivity Condition (i) ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6} (see Table 3.2).
There is a (regular) Veltman model 〈W ′, R′, {S′w : w ∈ W ′}, V ′〉 and a map
f : W → ℘(W ′) so that for each w ∈ W and each w′ ∈ f(w) we have for any
formula B that
M, w  B if and only if M′, w′ ′ B.
Here  is the forcing relation in M based on V and ′ is the forcing relation in
M′ based on V ′.
Proof. We refer the reader to [57] for details and mainly present the definition
of M′ here as was given in [76]. We will define a regular Veltman model M′
out of generalised Veltman model M. The main idea is that we will take many
copies of worlds in M. When we define some x′S′wy
′ we should take into account
that the single worlds x′ and y′ from M′ somehow come from worlds x and y
from M where these x and y fulfilled many roles as elements of images of the
S relation. To capture this richness of the generalised Veltman semantics, we
shall choose some representatives from S images. To this end, we first define
for every world x ∈ W a set SR(x) which contains all sets which are so-called
S-representatives in a sense that whenever xSuV , then any S-representatives of
x will mention some non-zero number of elements of V . The formal definition
reads as follows:
SR(x) :=
{
A ⊂W ×W | ∀u∀V⊆W (xSuV ⇒ ∃ v∈V 〈u, v〉 ∈ A) &
∀u, v
(
〈u, v〉 ∈ A⇒ ∃ V⊆W (xSuV & v ∈ V ))} .
We observe that a world x will typically have many S-representatives. In the
new model, we will consider all of them. Thus, we can now define the domain
as
W ′ := {〈x,A〉 | A∈SR(x) or SR(x) = ∅ = A}.
To conclude, the relations are defined as
〈x,A〉R′〈y,B〉 :⇔ xRy & ∀w, z(wRx & 〈w, z〉 ∈ B ⇒ 〈w, z〉 ∈ A);
〈x,A〉S′〈w,C〉〈y,B〉 :⇔ 〈w,C〉R′〈x,A〉 & 〈w,C〉R′〈y,B〉 &
∀v (〈w, v〉 ∈ B ⇒ 〈w, v〉 ∈ A);
and finally 〈x,A〉  p :⇔ x  p. Verbrugge proved that M′ indeed defines a
regular Veltman model and that moreover, for each formula A, for each world
x and for each V ⊆W so that 〈x, V 〉 ∈W ′ we have x  A ⇔ 〈x, V 〉 ′ A.
Verbrugge showed the above theorem for generalised Veltman models with
quasi-transitivity Condition (6). We have slightly improved the result by show-
ing that it also holds for Conditions (3), (4) and (5). The above proof, together
with a substantial simplification, has been fully formalised in the proof assis-
tant Agda and is presented in [57]. Vukovic studies10 in [89] how obtaining a
10The proof in [89] contains a minor typo/error and in [57] this is addressed.
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Veltman model from a Generalised Veltman model can be performed for the,
by now standard, transitivity Condition 2.
The above observations tell us that when it comes to models, regular Veltman
semantics and generalised Veltman semantics are equally powerful. With respect
to frames the panorama is very different. Before we make this precise, let us
first discuss frame conditions for GVS.
Let X be a modal axiom scheme. We denote by (X)gen a formula of first-
order or higher-order logic such that for all generalised Veltman frames F the
following holds:
F  X if and only if F |= (X)gen.
The formula (X)gen is called characteristic property (or frame condition) of
the given logic ILX. The class of all generalised Veltman frames F such that
F |= (X)gen is called the characteristic class of generalised frames for ILX. If
F |= (X)gen we also say that the frame F possesses the property (X)gen. We
say that a generalised Veltman model M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}, V 〉 is an
ILgenX-model, or that model M possesses the property (X)gen, if the frame
〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}〉 possesses the property (X)gen.
Vukovic´ [89] studied in a general setting how to transform a generalised
Veltman model to an ordinary Veltman model much in the spirit of Theorem
3.4, such that these two models are bisimilar (in some aptly defined sense).
Such a program can only yield partial answers w.r.t. frames since, as we shall
see in Section 6, the logic ILP0 is complete w.r.t. generalised semantics, but
incomplete w.r.t. ordinary semantics.
4 Generalised Veltman semantics for separating
systems
In this section we briefly mention some results where GVS has been used to prove
independence of various systems. However, what makes GVS really interesting
in our opinion, are its good model-theoretical properties. We will discuss those
in later sections.
4.1 Principles and Veltman models
In [80], Visser studies among others relations between various extensions of
the basic interpretability logic IL. Among others, he considered the following
principles:
W := AB → AB ∧2¬A;
KW1 := A3> → > ¬A;
F := A3A→ 2¬A.
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Visser observed11 that all of W, F and KW1 define proper extensions of IL
that have the same frame condition w.r.t. Veltman semantics: for each w, the
relation R◦Sw should be conversely well-founded. Further, he noted that ILW `
KW1 and ILW ` F (already in [79]) and he posed as an open question if the
converse also holds (over IL). As a mere curiosity it was mentioned that a slight
weakening of F does not yield any extension of IL. We repeat that here: if we
take the contraposition 3A→ ¬(A3A) of F and replace the implication by an
interpretability modality we obtain an IL provable formula12: 3A¬(A3A).
Another family of principles studied in [79] is given by:
M := AB → A ∧2C B ∧2C;
KM1 := A3B → 2(A→ 3B);
KM2 := AB → (2(B → 3C)→ 2(A→ 3C)).
It was observed that all of M, KM1 and KM2 have the same frame condition
w.r.t. Veltman semantics: ySwzRu ⇒ yRu. Similar to the previous family, it
was observed that ILM ` KM1,KM2 and posed in [79, 80] as an open question
if the converse also holds (over IL). For this family it was proven in [79] that
KM1 and KM2 are interderivable over IL. Moreover, just as W follows from
ILM, we also have that KW1 follows from ILKM1.
Sˇvejdar in 1991 took up the above mentioned questions of Visser’s whether
certain reversals like ILKM1 ` M hold. Ordinary Veltman models were suitable
to distinguish all combinations of the following principles of interpretability [74]:
W, M, KM1, KW1, KW10, and F, where
KW10 := A ∧B 3A→ A (A ∧ ¬B).
Unlike most other proofs of independence results which rely on differences in
characteristic classes, parts of his proofs are based on exhibiting particular mod-
els that globally satisfy one of the principles in question. For example, his proof
that IL{F,KW1} 0 KW10 exhibits an ILF-model that globally satisfies KW1,
but refutes KW10. As a consequence, Sˇvejdar established that the logics ILF,
ILKW1 and ILKM1 are incomplete with respect to their class of frames.
4.2 Generalised frame conditions and independence
In the previous subsection we saw various principles having the same frame
condition. However, their frame conditions for GVS differ and as such this
provides a way of telling different logics apart. In this section we will simply
present a collection of generalised frame conditions and leave it as an easy
exercise that they are all different from each other. Verbrugge [76] determined
11Even though indeed KW1 is similar in flavour, it turned out that its frame-condition is
actually, contrary to what Visser thought and so announced in [80], different from that of W.
Sˇvejdar computed and published the corrected condition in [74]: for each wRy there exists
x∈M(w) such that ySwx, where M(w) := {x∈R[w] : there is no z∈R[w] such that x (Sw◦R) z}.
12Principle K10 in [79].
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(M)gen, (KM1)gen, and (P)gen:
(M)gen := uSwV ⇒ (∃V ′ ⊆ V )(uSwV ′ & R[V ′] ⊆ R[u]);
(KM1)gen := uSwV ⇒ (∃v ∈ V )∀z(vRz ⇒ uRz);
(P)gen := wRw
′RuSwV ⇒ (∃V ′ ⊆ V ) uSw′V ′.
She proved ILKM1 0 M, ILF 0W, and ILF 0 KW1 using GVS.
There are two more principles that frequently occur in the literature. First,
there is
M0 := AB → 3A ∧2C B ∧2C.
And second, there is
W∗ := AB → B ∧2C B ∧2C ∧2¬A.
Visser showed in [81] that ILW 6` M0 and that ILM0W = ILW∗.
Vukovic´ in [87] determined the formula (M0)gen :
(M0)gen := wRuRxSwV ⇒ (∃V ′ ⊆ V )(uSwV ′ & R[V ′] ⊆ R[u]).
and proved independence of the principle M0 with various others principles of
interpretability. All connections between principles M, M0, KM1, KM2, P,
W, W∗, KW10, KW1 and F were determined in [88] using GVS. Vukovic´
provided in [88] a comparative modal study of all these principles together using
GVS. The result of this study can be summarized by the following diagram:
P
?
M
 
 
 
 	
@
@
@
@R
M0 ff W∗
?
KM1 -
 
 
 
 	
KM2ff
W - KW10
 
 
 	
@
@
@R
F KW1
Joosten and Visser presented a new IL(All) principle
P0 := A3B → 2(AB)
in Joosten’s master thesis [42]. Using GVS but without establishing the frame
condition for P0 Joosten could prove that W,M0 and P0 are maximally inde-
pendent (no two imply the other).
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Goris and Joosten considered the principle P0 in [27] and presented a related
new principle that has the same frame condition
R := AB → ¬(A ¬C)B ∧2C.
They determined formulas (P0)gen and (R)gen. Here are slightly reformulated
versions from [61]:
(P0)gen := wRxRuSwV & (∀v ∈ V )R[v] ∩ Z 6= ∅ ⇒ (∃Z ′ ⊆ Z)uSxZ ′;
(R)gen := wRxRuSwV ⇒ (∀C ∈ C(x, u))(∃U ⊆ V )(xSwU & R[U ] ⊆ C).
where C(x, u) = {C ⊆ R[x] : (∀Z)(uSxZ ⇒ Z ∩ C 6= ∅)} is the family of
“choice sets”. They proved ILWP0M0 6` R using GVS. Instead of providing a
GVS frame condition for W, the authors proved a necessary and sufficient GVS
frame condition for W to fail.
Definition 4.1.
Not-W := ∃w, z0, {Yi}i∈ω, {yi}i∈ω, yi∈Yi , Z, {zi+1}i∈ω, zi+1∈Z
[∀i ∈ ω(ziSwYi 3 yiRzi+i) &
∀z ∈ Z∃i ∈ ωzSwYi &
∀z ∈ Z∀Y (zSwY & Y ⊆ (∪i∈ωYi) ⇒ ∃z′ ∈ Z∃y ∈ Y yRz′)]
Lemma 4.2. For any generalised Veltman frame F we have that
F |= Not-W if and only if F 6|= W.
A positive frame condition for W is presented in Section 6.4.
5 Modal completeness: preliminaries
The aim of this and the next section is to explore modal completeness with re-
spect to GVS. We will give the state-of-the-art of completeness results involving
GVS. Let us first say a few words on the history of modal completeness proofs
concerning interpretability logics.
This and the following section are based heavily on the recent paper [61].
For this reason we will not cite results; for any definition or result without a
reference it is safe to assume it is being quoted from [61].
5.1 Overview of approaches
De Jongh and Veltman proved the completeness of IL, ILM and ILP w.r.t. the
corresponding characteristic classes of ordinary (and finite) Veltman frames in
[17]. As is usual for extensions of the provability logic GL, all completeness
proofs suffer from compactness-related issues. One way to go about this is to
define a (large enough) adequate set of formulas and let worlds be maximal
consistent subsets of such sets (used e.g. in [17]). With interpretability logics
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and ordinary Veltman semantics, worlds have not been identified with (only)
sets of formulas. It seems that with ordinary Veltman semantics it is sometimes
necessary to duplicate worlds (that is, have more than one world correspond to
a single maximal consistent set) in order to build models for certain consistent
sets (see e.g. [17]). In [18], de Jongh and Veltman proved completeness of the
logic ILW w.r.t. its characteristic class of ordinary (and finite) Veltman frames.
Goris and Joosten, inspired by Dick de Jongh, introduced13 a more robust
approach to proving completeness of interpretability logics, the construction
method or step-by-step method ([26, 27]). In this type of proofs, one builds
models step by step, and the final model is retrieved as a union. While closer to
the intuition and more informative than the standard proofs, these proofs are
hard to produce and verify due to their size. (They might have been shorter
if tools from [8, 25] have been used from the start.) For the purpose for which
this type of proofs was invented (completeness of ILM0 and ILW
∗ w.r.t. the
ordinary semantics), this type of proofs is still the only known approach that
works.
In [61] a very direct type of proofs of completeness is presented; similar
to [17] in the general approach, but this time with respect to GVS. The so-
called assuring labels from [8, 25] were used as a key step. These completeness
proofs are the ones that we aim to explore here. An example that illustrates
benefits of using the generalised semantics will be given in the section dedicated
to ILM0. The most interesting of these results are completeness of ILR and
ILP0. The principle R is important because it forms the basis of the, at the
moment, best explicit candidate for IL(All) as discussed in more detail in Section
8. Results concerning the principle ILP0 are interesting in a different way;
they answer an old question: is there an unravelling technique that transforms
generalised ILX-models to ordinary ILX-models, that preserves satisfaction of
relevant characteristic properties? The answer is no: ILP0 is complete w.r.t.
GVS, but it is known to be incomplete w.r.t. the ordinary semantics ([27]).
5.2 Completeness w.r.t. generalised semantics
In what follows, “formula” will always mean “modal formula”. If the ambient
logic in some context is ILX, a maximal consistent set w.r.t. ILX will be called
an ILX-MCS. Let us now introduce assuring labels from [8] and [25].
Definition 5.1 ([8], a slightly modified Definition 3.1). Let w and u be some
ILX-MCS’s, and let S be an arbitrary set of formulas. We write w ≺S u if for
any finite S′ ⊆ S and any formula A we have that A ∨G∈S′ ¬G ∈ w implies
¬A,¬A ∈ u.
Note that the small differences between our Definition 5.1 and Definition 3.1
[8] do not affect the results of [8] that we use.14
13See our comments in Footnote 3 for some more detailed historical context. Also [19]
provides some comments on construction methods for other modal logics.
14 The difference is a different strategy of ensuring converse well-foundedness for the relation
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Definition 5.2 ([8], page 4). Let w be an ILX-MCS, and S an arbitrary set of
formulas. Put:
wS := {¬A : ∃S′ ⊆ S, S′ finite, A ∨
G∈S′
¬G ∈ w};
wS := {¬A,¬A : ∃S′ ⊆ S, S′ finite, A ∨
G∈S′
¬G ∈ w}.
Thus, w ≺S u if and only if wS ⊆ u. If S = ∅ then w∅ = {¬A : A⊥ ∈ w}.
Since w is maximal consistent, use of w2∅ usually amount to the same as the use
of the set {A : A ∈ w}.
We will usually write w ≺ u instead of w ≺∅ u.
Lemma 5.3 ([8], Lemma 3.2). Let w, u and v be some ILX-MCS’s, and let S
and T be some sets of formulas. Then we have:
a) if S ⊆ T and w ≺T u, then w ≺S u;
b) if w ≺S u ≺ v, then w ≺S v;
c) if w ≺S u, then S ⊆ u.
We will tacitly use the preceding lemma in most of our proofs. Although
not needed in this paper, we mention that in [25] it is shown that without loss
of generality we may actually assume that labels are full theories.
The following two lemmas can be used to construct (or in our case, find) a
MCS with the required properties.
Lemma 5.4 ([8], Lemma 3.4). Let w be an ILX-MCS, and let ¬(B  C) ∈ w.
Then there is an ILX-MCS u such that w ≺{¬C} u and B,¬B ∈ u.
Lemma 5.5 ([8], Lemma 3.5). Let w and u be some ILX-MCS’s such that
BC ∈ w, w ≺S u and B ∈ u. Then there is an ILX-MCS v such that w ≺S v
and C,¬C ∈ v.
In the remainder of this section, we will assume that D is always a finite set
of formulas, closed under taking subformulas and single negations, and > ∈ D.
The following definition is central to most of the results of this section.
Definition 5.6. Let X be a subset of {M, M0, P, P0, R}. We say that M =
〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}, V 〉 is the ILX-structure for a set of formulas D if:
W := {w : w is an ILX-MCS and for some G ∈ D, G ∧¬G ∈ w};
wRu :⇔ w ≺ u;
uSwV :⇔ wRu and, V ⊆ R[w] and, (∀S)(w ≺S u⇒ (∃v ∈ V )w ≺S v);
w ∈ V (p) :⇔ p ∈ w.
R. Instead of asking for the existence of some 3F ∈ w \ u whenever wRu, as is usual in the
context of provability (and interpretability) logics, we will go for a stronger condition (see
Definition 5.6). Since we will later put R :=≺, this choice of ours is reflected already at this
point.
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We note that the ILX-structure for D is a unique object. In fact, we could
work with just one “ILX-structure” (that would not depend even on D): the
disjoint union of ILX-structures for all choices of D. We also observe that
the definition entails that when uSwV , then V 6= ∅ since wRu ⇒ w ≺∅ u so
∃(v ∈ V )w ≺∅ v.
Notice that worlds in the definition above are somewhat more restricted
than what is usually found in similar proofs: every world is required to be R-
maximal with respect to some formula. That is, for every world w ∈ W we
want to have a formula Gw such that w  Gw and for any R-successor u of
w, u 1 Gw. This is equivalent to the requirement that for some formula Gw,
w  Gw ∧ 2¬Gw. Of course, before we prove our truth lemma we can only
require that Gw ∧ 2¬Gw ∈ w. Because of this we need the following lemma
whose proof boils down to an instance of Lo¨b’s axiom.
Lemma 5.7. If ILX 0 ¬A then there is an ILX-MCS w such that A∧¬A ∈ w.
We are now ready to prove the main lemma of this section, which tells us
that the structure defined in Definition 5.6 really is a generalised Veltman model.
Notice that we do not claim that it is also an ILgenX-model; we prove that later.
Lemma 5.8. Let X be a subset of {M, M0, P, P0, R}. The ILX-structure M for
a set of formulas D is a generalised Veltman model. Furthermore, the following
truth lemma holds:
M, w  G if and only if G ∈ w,
for all G ∈ D and w ∈W.
Proof. Most of the proof is straightforward. Let us just comment the proof of
the truth lemma, more specifically, the following claim in the induction step:
w  BC ⇒ BC ∈ w. This part is probably the most interesting one, since
it explains the motivation behind the definition of Sw in Definition 5.6.
Assume B  C /∈ w. Lemma 5.4 implies there is u with w ≺{¬C} u and
B,¬B ∈ u (thus u ∈ W ). It is immediate that wRu and the induction
hypothesis implies that u  B. Assume uSwV. We are to show that V 1 C.
Since w ≺{¬C} u and uSwV , there is v ∈ V such that w ≺{¬C} v. Lemma 5.3
implies ¬C ∈ v. The induction hypothesis implies v 1 C; thus V 1 C.
This lemma is just one step away from a completeness proof:
Theorem 5.9. Let X ⊆ {M, M0, P, P0, R}. Assume that for every set D the
ILX-structure for D possesses the property (X)gen. Then ILX is complete w.r.t.
ILgenX-models.
Proof. Let A be a formula such that ILX 0 ¬A. Lemma 5.7 implies there is
an ILX-MCS w such that A ∧¬A ∈ w. Let D have the usual properties, and
contain A. Let M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}, V 〉 be the ILX-structure for D. Since
A∧¬A ∈ w and A ∈ D, we have w ∈W . Lemma 5.8 implies M, w 1 ¬A.
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Corollary 5.10. The logic IL is complete w.r.t. GVS.
Note that any method for transforming generalised to ordinary models like
presented in Theorem 3.4 or in [89] now implies completeness of IL w.r.t. ordi-
nary Veltman models.
In the next section we comment on the completeness of the following logics
w.r.t. GVS: ILM, ILM0, ILP, ILP0, ILR, ILW and ILW
∗.
5.3 A note on generalised Veltman semantics and labelling
In all studied extensions of IL we have to duplicate maximal consistent sets
when building ordinary Veltman models for consistent sets of formulas. More
accurately, no one seems to have come up with a natural way of assigning just
one purpose to every maximal consistent set of formulas. For example, when
building a model where {¬(p  q),¬(p  r), p  (q ∨ r)} is true in some world
w, we could try to use the same set/world u visible from w as a witness for the
formulas ¬(pq) and ¬(pr) in w. For example, this may be the set where the
only propositional formula is p, and no formula of form ¬(AB) is contained.
But, due to p (q ∨ r), in any model where w is there we do require two worlds
like u within that model; one of which will have an Sw-successor satisfying q
but not r, and the other one an Sw-successor satisfying r but not q.
GVS doesn’t share this problem of duplication, at least not in any known
case of a complete extension of IL. A generalised model for the problem above
is simple. Let w = {¬(p q),¬(p r), p (q ∨ r)}, u = {p}, x = {q}, y = {r},
and let wRuSw{x, y}. Unspecified propositional formulas are assumed to be
false, and unspecified -formulas are assumed to be true.
Now, having in mind this generalised model, what can be said about the
wRu transition in terms of labels? This might be important if we are building
a generalised model step-by-step. Since u has two roles, it would be natural to
allow (even with assuringness) two labels: {¬q} and {¬r}. And these labels are
justified, since indeed {x, y} 1 q, r. Both these labels are expressible without
sets (in terms of criticality, for example, the labels would be formulas q, and r,
respectively). We recall that the Sw from Definition 5.6 indeed takes multiple
labels into account.
However, there is another bit of label-related information that these facts do
not express: which labels do not hold. Although {¬q} and {¬r} are justified
choices, the label {¬q,¬r} is not a good choice. This label would require ¬p /∈ u,
which is clearly not the case. This is the information the assuringness allows
us to express, and criticality does not.15 Note that such a situation cannot
happen in ordinary semantics: if the label {¬q,¬r} is inappropriate for some
wRu transition, that means there is A ∈ u with A  q ∨ r ∈ w. This, since we
are now working in ordinary semantics, means there should be an Sw-successor
15 Granted, one might say that the inadequacy of the assuring label {¬q,¬r} is equivalent
to the inadequacy of the critical label q∨r. However, expressing this fact in terms of criticality
does not retain structural information of our situation; we see a disjunction where really we
are only interested in disjuncts.
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of u satisfying q ∨ r. So, either this new world satisfies q or r. So, {¬q} or {¬r}
had to be inappropriate labels (for wRu) too.
6 Modal completeness of various systems
In this section we explore completeness proofs for various extensions of IL.
We also briefly describe a recent preprint where certain subsystems of IL are
explored.
6.1 The logic ILM
Completeness of the logic ILM w.r.t. GVS is an easy consequence of the com-
pleteness of ILM w.r.t. the ordinary semantics, first proved by de Jongh and
Veltman ([17]). Another proof of the same result was given by Goris and
Joosten, using the construction method ([27, 42]).
The frame condition wRxSwyRz ⇒ xRz for M is reflected in the following
so-called labelling lemma:
Lemma 6.1 ([8], Lemma 3.7). Let w and u be some ILM-MCS’s, and let S be
a set of formulas. If w ≺S u then w ≺S∪u∅ u.
When we combine this with the main result of the previous section we get a
simple, elegant and succinct completeness proof.
Theorem 6.2. The logic ILM is complete w.r.t. ILgenM-models.
Proof. Here we give the whole proof from [61], to demonstrate the interplay
between labelling lemmas and characteristic properties. Proofs for other logics
are similar, though usually more complex.
Given Theorem 5.9, it suffices to show that for any set D, the ILM-structure
for D possesses the property (M)gen: uSwV ⇒ (∃V ′ ⊆ V )(uSwV ′ & R[V ′] ⊆
R[u]. Let 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}, V 〉 be the ILM-structure for D.
Let uSwV and take V
′ = {v ∈ V : w ≺u∅ v}. We claim uSwV
′ and
R[V ′] ⊆ R[u]. Suppose w ≺S u. Lemma 6.1 implies w ≺S∪u∅ u. Since uSwV ,
by Definition 5.6, there is v ∈ V with w ≺S∪u∅ v. So, v ∈ V
′. Thus, uSwV ′.
Now let v ∈ V ′ and z ∈ W be such that vRz. Since v ∈ V ′, we know
w ≺u∅ v. Then for all B ∈ u we have B ∈ v. Since vRz, we have B,B ∈ z.
So, u ≺ z and by Definition 5.6 uRz.
6.2 The logic ILM0
Modal completeness of ILM0 w.r.t. ordinary Veltman semantics was proved in
[26] by Goris and Joosten. Certain difficulties encountered in this proof were
our main motivation for using GVS. We will sketch one of these difficulties and
show in what way the generalised semantics overcomes it. The frame condition
wRxRySwuRz ⇒ xRz for M0 is reflected in the following labelling lemma:
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Figure 2: Left: extending an ordinary Veltman model. Right: extending a
generalised Veltman model. Straight lines represent R-transitions, while curved
lines represent Sw-transitions. Full lines represent the starting configuration,
and dashed lines represent the transitions that are to be added. This figure is
also taken from [61].
Lemma 6.3 ([8], Lemma 3.9). Let w, u and x be ILM0-MCS’s, and S an
arbitrary set of formulas. If w ≺S u ≺ x then w ≺S∪u∅ x.
To motivate our way of proving completeness (of ILM0, but also in general)
w.r.t. GVS, let us sketch a situation for which there are clear benefits in working
with GVS. We do this only now because ILM0 is sufficiently complex to display
(some of) these benefits. Suppose we are building models step-by-step (as in
the construction method from [26]), and worlds w, u1, u2 and x occur in the
configuration displayed in Figure 2. Furthermore, suppose we need to produce
an Sw-successor v of x.
With the ordinary semantics, we need to ensure that for our Sw-successor
v, for each B1 ∈ u1 and B2 ∈ u2, we have B1,B2 ∈ v. It is not obvious
that such a construction is possible. In case of ILM0, it was successfully solved
in [26] by preserving the invariant that sets of boxed formulas in ui are linearly
ordered. This way, finite (quasi-)models can always be extended by only looking
at the last ui.
With GVS, we need to produce a whole set of worlds V , but the requirements
from the frame condition wRuRxSwV ⇒ (∃V ′ ⊆ V )(uSwV ′ & R[V ′] ⊆ R[u]))
on each particular world are less demanding. For each ui, there has to be a
corresponding Vi ⊆ V with Bi contained (true) in every world of Vi. Lemma
6.3 gives a recipe for producing such worlds.
Theorem 6.4. The logic ILM0 is complete w.r.t. ILgenM0-models.
Proof. Omitted. See [61] for details.
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6.3 The logics ILP, ILP0 and ILR
The logics ILP, ILP0 and ILR can be proven to be complete with respect to
their classes of frames in a similar way (see [61] for details).
We recall that the interpretability logic ILP0 is incomplete w.r.t. Veltman
models ([27]). Since ILP0 is complete w.r.t. GVS, this is the first example of
an interpretability logic complete w.r.t. GVS, but incomplete w.r.t. ordinary
semantics.
6.4 The logics ILW and ILW∗
To prove that ILW is complete, one could try to find a sufficiently strong “la-
belling lemma” and use Definition 5.6 (ILX-structure). One candidate might
be the following condition:
w ≺S u ⇒ (∃G ∈ D)
(
w ≺S∪{¬G} u & G ∈ u
)
,
where D is finite, closed under subformulas and such that each w ∈W contains
Aw and 2¬Aw for some Aw ∈ D. If there is such a condition, it would greatly
simplify proofs of completeness for extensions of ILW. Unfortunately, at the
moment we do not know if such a condition can be formulated and proved.
Another approach is to use a modified version of Definition 5.6 to work with
ILW and its extensions. This way we won’t require a labelling lemma, but
we lose generality in the following sense. To prove the completeness of ILXW,
for some X, it no longer suffices to simply show that the structure defined in
Definition 5.6 has the required characteristic property (when each world is an
ILX-MCS). Instead, the characteristic property of ILX has to be shown to hold
on the modified structure. So, to improve compatibility with proofs based on
Definition 5.6, we should prove the completeness of ILW with a definition as
similar to Definition 5.6 as possible. That is what we do in the remainder of
this section. This approach turns out to be good enough for ILW∗ (ILWM0).
We didn’t succeed in using it to prove the completeness of ILWR. However, to
the best of our knowledge, ILWR might not be complete at all.
We have already mentioned the Not-W frame condition in Definition 4.1 that
characterises when W fails on GVS. The positive condition (W)gen from [60] is
given by:
(W)gen := uSwV ⇒ (∃V ′ ⊆ V )
(
uSwV
′ & R[V ′] ∩ S−1w [V ] = ∅
)
.
We will use (this formulation of) (W)gen in what follows. We note here that
the (W)gen condition can be formulated in a more informative way. Whenever
there are w, u and V such that (w, u, V ) is a counterexample to (W)gen, there
is U ⊆ V such that:
(i) (w, u, U) is a counterexample to (W)gen;
(ii) R[U ] ∩ U = ∅;
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(iii) there are sets U0 and U such that:
• U = U0 ∪ U and U 6= ∅;
• U0 = {v ∈ U : R[v] ∩ S−1w [U ] = ∅};
• U = {v ∈ U \ U0 : ∀V ′
( ∃z vRzSwV ′ ⊆ U ⇒ V ′ ∩ U 6= ∅ )}.
This new formulation tells us that we can pick a set U and a quasi-partition
{U0, U} of U such that points in U0 cannot “return” to U , while the points in
U can “return” to U , and have an additional property that every such “return”
intersects (not only U but also) U . The proof that such U can always be found
will be available in the third author’s PhD thesis ([58]).
In the proof of completeness of logic ILW we will use the following two
lemmas. In what follows, ILWX denotes an arbitrary extension of ILW.
Lemma 6.5 ([8], Lemma 3.12). Let w be an ILWX-MCS, and B and C formulas
such that ¬(BC) ∈ w. Then there is an ILWX-MCS u such that w≺{¬B,¬C}u
and B ∈ u.
Lemma 6.6 ([8], Lemma 3.13). Let w and u be some ILWX-MCS, B and C
some formulas, and S a set of formulas such that BC ∈ w, w ≺S u and B ∈ u.
Then there is an ILWX-MCS v such that w ≺S∪{¬B} v and C,¬C ∈ v.
Given a binary relation R, let R˙[x] = R[x] ∪ {x}. If the set R˙[x] contains
maximal consistent sets (which it usually does in this section), then
⋃
R˙[x] is
a set of formulas. If satisfaction coincides with formulas contained, then it is
useful to think of
⋃
R˙[x] as the set of formulas B such that either B or 3B is
satisfied in x (however, one has to be careful with such an interpretation, since
we do not claim a truth lemma to hold for all formulas).
Definition 6.7. Let X be W or W∗. We say that M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}, V 〉
is the ILX-structure for a set of formulas D if:
W := {w : w is an ILX-MCS and for some G ∈ D, G ∧¬G ∈ w};
wRu :⇔ w ≺ u;
uSwV :⇔ wRu and, V ⊆ R[w] and, one of the following holds:
(a) V ∩ R˙[u] 6= ∅;
(b) (∀S)
(
w ≺S u⇒ (∃v ∈ V )
(
∃G ∈ D ∩⋃ R˙[u]) w ≺S∪{¬G} v) ;
w ∈ V (p) :⇔ p ∈ w.
With this definition, we can now prove a truth lemma.
Lemma 6.8. Let X be W or W*. The ILX-structure M for D is a generalised
Veltman model. Furthermore, the following holds:
M, w  G if and only if G ∈ w,
for each G ∈ D and w ∈W.
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Proof. The proof of this claim is lengthy (mostly due to the way quasi-transitivity
is defined in Definition 6.7). However, the proof is straightforward. See our com-
ment in the proof of Lemma 5.8. For details please refer to [61].
This lemma brings us one step away from a completeness proof. We first
introduce the following notation: Let B be a formula, and w a world in a
generalised Veltman model. We write [B]w for {u : wRu and u  B}.
Theorem 6.9. The logic ILW is complete w.r.t. ILgenW-models.
Proof. Sketch. In the light of Lemma 6.8, it suffices to show that the ILW-
structure M for D possesses the property (W)gen. Recall the characteristic
property (W)gen:
uSwV ⇒ (∃V ′ ⊆ V )
(
uSwV
′ & R[V ′] ∩ S−1w [V ] = ∅
)
.
Suppose for a contradiction that there are w, u and V such that:
uSwV & (∀V ′ ⊆ V )(uSwV ′ ⇒ R[V ′] ∩ S−1w [V ] 6= ∅). (1)
Let V denote the collection of all such sets V (keeping w and u fixed).
Let n = 2|D|. Fix any enumeration D0, . . . ,Dn−1 of P(D) that satisfies
D0 = ∅. We define a new relation Siw for each 0 ≤ i < n as follows:
ySiwU :⇐⇒ ySwU, Di ⊆
⋃
R˙[y], U ⊆
[ ∨
G∈Di
¬G
]
w
.
It can be shown that whenever ySwU , we also have:
(∃U ′ ⊆ U)(∃i < n) ySiwU ′. (2)
Let m < n be maximal such that there are U ∈ V and U ′ ⊆ U with the
following properties:
(i) (∀x ∈ U)[(∃y ∈ R[x])(∃Z ⊆ U)(∃i ≤ m) ySiwZ ⇒ x /∈ U ′];
(ii) (∀x ∈W )(xSwU ⇒ xSwU ′).
Since D0 = ∅, we have [
∨
G∈D0 ¬G]w = [⊥]w = ∅. So there are no Z ⊆
[
∨
G∈D0 ¬G]w such that ySwZ for some y ∈ W . So, if we take m = 0 and
U ′ = U for any U ∈ V, (i) and (ii) are trivially satisfied.
Since n is finite and conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied for at least one value
m, there must be a maximal m < n with the required properties.
Finally, it can be shown that, contrary to the assumption of the maximality
of m, m + 1 also satisfies properties (i) and (ii). We omit details since the full
proof is somewhat cumbersome. For details please refer to [61].
Goris and Joosten proved in [26] the completeness of W∗ (recall that this is
equivalent to ILWM0) w.r.t. ordinary Veltman semantics. This theorem has its
analogue in GVS.
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Theorem 6.10. The logic ILW∗ is complete w.r.t. ILgenW ∗-models.
Proof. From Lemma 6.8, it suffices to prove that the ILW∗-structure for D
possesses the properties (W)gen and (M0)gen, for each appropriate D. So, let
M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}, V 〉 be the ILW∗-structure for D. Theorem 6.9
shows that the model M possesses the property (W)gen. It remains to show
that it possesses the property (M0)gen.
The remainder of this proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 6.4.
Please refer to [61] for details.
In [60] it is shown that ILW∗ possesses the finite model property w.r.t. gen-
eralised Veltman models. To show decidability, (stronger) completeness w.r.t.
ordinary Veltman models was used in [60]. However, we observe that Theorem
6.10 above suffices for the mere purpose of decidability.
6.5 The logic ILWR
In previous subsections we saw that the completeness of ILR can be proven
using ILR-structures, and that the completeness of ILW can be proven using
ILW-structures. These two types of structures are defined differently. However,
we saw that ILW∗-structures have the same general form as ILW-structures.
So, one may hope to prove completeness of ILWR with the help of a structure
defined similarly to ILW-structures.
Unfortunately, it seems that ILWR-structures, if by an ILWR-structure we
mean an ILW-structure with the notion of ILW-consistency replaced with that
of ILWR-consistency, does not posses the characteristic property (R)gen. In [25]
we call the type of a problem that emerges here “the label iteration problem”.
In the same paper we demonstrate how to overcome this problem for a simpler
logic. With ILWR we have some progress, but are not yet sure if we can really
solve it.
6.6 Logics below IL
Just as this chapter was being prepared, a preprint written by Kurahashi and
Okawa appeared ([51]), using GVS to prove completeness and decidability of
certain subsystems of IL. The authors define a new logic, IL−, similarly to IL,
but without axiom (schema)s J1, J2, J4 and J5. However, they add new rules
to the system:
R1: if ` A→ B then ` C A→ C B;
R2: if ` A→ B then ` B  C → A C.
These new rules can be seen as approximating J1 and J2. The authors also
require 2A↔ ¬A⊥ to hold by definition.
The paper proceeds to study twenty logics between IL− and IL. Twelve of
these are proven to be complete with respect to a version of ordinary Veltman
semantics. The remaining eight are incomplete w.r.t. such semantics, and com-
plete with respect to a version of GVS. Their style of proof is similar to [17]
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and [61]. The authors define their whole models all at once (in a non-iterative
construction), and the general structure of the definitions of relations Sw is,
roughly, “uSwV if whenever there is a label Σ between w and u, there should
be a corresponding world v ∈ V with the same label Σ between w and v”.
The results from [51] on subsystems of IL lend support to the conviction
that Generalised semantics is robust and widely applicable. See also Remark 4
in Section 1.3 of [56].
7 Bisimulations and filtrations
In this section we introduce and establish basic properties of bisimulations be-
tween generalised Veltman models. Next, we use bisimilarity to define equiva-
lence classes when we employ the method of filtrations, which in turn we use to
prove finite model property and decidability of various logics.
7.1 Bisimulations
Visser [80] defined the notion of a bisimulation between Veltman models. Vrgocˇ
and Vukovic´ [86] extended this definition to generalised Veltman models.
Definition 7.1. A bisimulation between generalised Veltman models
M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, R′, {S′w′ : w′ ∈ W ′}, V ′〉 is a
non-empty relation Z ⊆W ×W ′ such that:
(at) if wZw′, then M, w  p if and only if M′, w′ ′ p, for all
propositional variables p;
(forth) if wZw′ and wRu, then there is u′ ∈ W ′ such that w′R′u′,
uZu′ and for all V ′ ⊆ W ′ such that u′S′w′V ′ there is V ⊆ W
such that uSwV and for all v ∈ V there is v′ ∈ V ′ with vZv′;
(back) if wZw′ and w′R′u′, then there is u ∈W such that wRu, uZu′
and for all V ⊆W such that uSwV there is V ′ ⊆W ′ such that
u′S′w′V
′ and for all v′ ∈ V ′ there is v ∈ V with vZv′.
We say that w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′ are bisimilar if there is a bisimulation
Z ⊆W ×W ′ such that wZw′.
The following lemma is proved by Vrgocˇ and Vukovic´ in [86].
Lemma 7.2. Let M, M′ and M′′ be generalised Veltman models.
a) If w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′ are bisimilar, then they are modally equivalent,
i.e. they satisfy the same formulas in the language of IL.
b) The identity {(w,w) : w ∈W} ⊆W ×W is a bisimulation.
c) The inverse of a bisimulation between M and M′ is a bisimulation between
M′ and M.
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d) The composition of bisimulations Z ⊆ W ×W ′ and Z ′ ⊆ W ′ ×W ′′ is a
bisimulation between M and M′′.
e) The union of a family of bisimulations between M and M′ is also a bisim-
ulation between M and M′. Thus there exists the largest bisimulation
between models M and M′.
The previous lemma shows that this notion of bisimulation has certain de-
sired properties. A property that significantly contributes to whether the notion
of bisimulation can be considered well-behaved is the Hennessy–Milner property.
We say that a generalised Veltman model M = 〈W,R; {Sw : w ∈W}, V 〉 is im-
age finite if the set R[w] is finite, for all w ∈ W . The following theorem is
proved in [86].
Theorem 7.3 (Hennessy-Milner16 property). Let M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈
W}, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, R′, {S′w : w ∈ W ′}, V ′〉 be two image finite generalised
Veltman models. If w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′ are modally equivalent, then there
exists a bisimulation Z such that wZw′.
In [86] several other notions of a bisimulation (V-bisimulation, strong and
global bisimulation) are considered and the connections between them are ex-
plored.
In [76] and [89], connections between Veltman semantics and generalised
Veltman semantics are considered. In [89] it is shown that for a restricted class
of generalised Veltman models M (the so-called complete image finite models)
there exists an ordinary Veltman model M′ that is bisimilar to M.
In the section concerning completeness, we commented on why in general
there cannot exist an ordinary ILP0-model that is bisimilar to a given ILgenP0-
model. That example shows that for at least some cases ordinary Veltman
semantics is not expressive enough to capture the behaviour of interpretability
logics.
In [67] the notion of n-bisimulation is defined similar to various existing
notions for other modal logics. Then, n-bisimulations are used in the proof of
the finite model property of various systems w.r.t. GVS.
Definition 7.4. An n-bisimulation between generalised Veltman models M =
〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈W}, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, R′, {S′w′ : w′ ∈W ′}, V ′〉 is a decreasing
sequence of relations Zn ⊆ Zn−1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Z1 ⊆ Z0 ⊆W ×W ′ such that:
(at) if wZ0w
′ then M, w  p if and only if M′, w′ ′ p, for all
propositional variables p;
(forth) if 0 < i 6 n, wZiw′ and wRu, then there exists u′ ∈ R′[w′]
such that uZi−1u′ and for all V ′ ∈ S′w′ [u′] there is V ∈ Sw[v]
such that for all v ∈ V there is v′ ∈ V ′ with vZi−1v′;
16The theorem for unary modal logic was already known to and published by van Benthem
[4].
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(back) if 0 < i 6 n, wZiw′ and w′R′u′, then there exists u ∈ R[w]
such that uZi−1u′ and for all V ∈ Sw[u] there is V ′ ∈ S′w′ [u′]
such that for all v′ ∈ V ′ there is v ∈ V with vZi−1v′.
We say that w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′ are n-bisimilar if there is an n-bisimulation
between M and M′ such that wZnw′.
We say that w and w′ are n-modally equivalent and we write w ≡n w′ if
w and w′ satisfy exactly the same formulas of the modal depth (that is, the
maximal number of nested modalities) up to n. The following lemma is proved
in [67].
Lemma 7.5. Let M = 〈W,R, {Sww ∈ W}, V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, R′, {S′w : w ∈
W ′}, V ′〉 be generalised Veltman models. Let w ∈W and w′ ∈W ′. We have:
1. if w and w′ are n-bisimilar, then w and w′ are n-modally equivalent;
2. if there are only finitely many propositional variables, then the converse
also holds: if w and w′ are n-modally equivalent, then w and w′ are n-
bisimilar.
7.2 Filtrations and the finite model property
The filtration method is often used to prove that a modal logic possesses the
finite model property. Perkov and Vukovic´ [67] applied this technique to GVS.
Here bisimilarity is used to refine models in order to preserve the structural
properties of generalised Veltman models.
Filtration usually employs partitions whose clusters contain logically equiva-
lent worlds. The equivalence need not be with respect to all formulas; usually a
finite set of formulas closed under taking subformulas suffices. In our case, some
additional properties of this set of formulas are required. Let A be a formula.
If A is not a negation, then ∼A denotes ¬A, and otherwise, if A is ¬B, then
∼A is B. It is convenient to take  to be the only modality in our language
and to define 2 and 3 as abbreviations: 3A as ¬(A  ⊥) and 2A as ∼3∼A,
i.e. ∼A  ⊥. We will give the definition of adequate sets used in [61]. It is an
extended version of the definition used in [67], where filtrations of generalised
Veltman models were originally introduced. The extended definition turns out
to be important for some logics.
Definition 7.6. Let D be a finite set of formulas that is closed under taking
subformulas and single negations ∼, and > ∈ D. We say that a set of formulas
ΓD is an adequate set (w.r.t. D) if it satisfies the following conditions:
a) ΓD is closed under taking subformulas;
b) if A ∈ ΓD then ∼A ∈ ΓD;
c) ⊥⊥ ∈ ΓD;
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d) AB ∈ ΓD if A is an antecedent or succedent of some -formula in ΓD,
and so is B;
e) if A ∈ D then ¬A ∈ ΓD.
Since the set of formulas D is finite, ΓD is finite too. Now, let M =
〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈ W}, V 〉 be a generalised Veltman model and let ΓD be an
adequate set of formulas w.r.t. some appropriate set D. For nodes w, u ∈ W ,
we write w ≡ΓD u if for all A ∈ ΓD we have M, w  A if and only if M, u  A.
Let ∼ ⊆ ≡ΓD be an equivalence relation on the set W . Denote the ∼-
equivalence class of w ∈W by [w], and V˜ = {[w] : w ∈ V } for any V ⊆W.
A filtration of a model M through ΓD,∼ is any generalised Veltman model
M˜ = 〈W˜ , R˜, {S˜[w] : [w] ∈ W˜}, V ′〉 such that for all w ∈W and A ∈ ΓD we have
M, w  A if and only if M˜, [w] ′ A. Fact e) of Lemma 7.2 implies that the
largest bisimulation ∼M of model M exists. Facts b), c) and d) of the same
lemma imply that ∼M is an equivalence relation, while a) implies ∼M ⊆ ≡ΓD .
Lemma 7.7 ([67], Lemma 2.3 and Theorem 2.4). Let M = 〈W,R, {Sw : w ∈
W}, V 〉 be a generalised Veltman model, ΓD an adequate set of formulas, and
∼M the largest bisimulation of model M. Let us define:
a) R˜ = {([w], [u]) : wRu and there is 2A ∈ ΓD such that M, w 6 2A and
M, u  2A};
b) [u]S˜[w]V˜ if and only if [w]R˜[u], V˜ ⊆ R˜
[
[w]
]
, and for all w′ ∈ [w] and
u′ ∈ [u] such that w′Ru′ we have u′Sw′V ′ for some V ′ such that V˜ ′ ⊆ V˜ ;
c) for all propositional variables p ∈ ΓD put [w] ∈ V ′(p) if and only if w ∈
V (p), and interpret propositional variables q /∈ ΓD arbitrarily (e.g. put
[w] 6∈ V (q) for all [w] ∈ W˜ ).
Then M˜ = 〈W˜ , R˜, {S˜[w] : [w] ∈ W˜}, V ′〉 is a filtration of the model M through
ΓD,∼M.
We can use the construction above to prove the finite model property of many
logics. Let us briefly sketch the proof. We start by fixing a formula A satisfied
in some model M and a finite adequate set ΓD such that A ∈ ΓD. For the
purposes of this proof, we assume the language contains only the propositional
variables that are contained in A. Let M˜ be a filtration of this model as described
above. We first prove that the length of R˜-chains is bounded by the number
of occurrences of boxed formulas in ΓD. This implies that bisimilarity can be
simplified to n-bisimilarity, for a sufficiently large n. Lemma 7.5 implies that
clusters are n-bisimilar if and only if they are modally n-equivalent. Thus there
can be only finitely many classes with respect to n-equivalence, implying our
model is finite.
Theorem 7.8 ([67]). The logic IL has the finite model property with respect to
generalised Veltman models.
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For IL, ILM, ILP and ILW, the original completeness proofs were proofs
of completeness w.r.t. appropriate finite models [17], [18]. For these logics,
the FMP w.r.t. the ordinary semantics and decidability are immediate (and
completeness and the FMP w.r.t. GVS are easily shown to follow from these
results). For more complex logics, not much is known about the FMP w.r.t. the
ordinary semantics.
To prove that a specific extension has the FMP, it remains to show that
filtration preserves its characteristic property. This approach was successfully
used to prove the FMP of ILM0, ILW
∗, ILP0 and ILR w.r.t. GVS [67], [60],
[61].
Since we have the finite model property, and “finite” can be taken to mean
finite in every sense (i.e. there is a finite code, obtainable in a straightforward
manner, for every such model), we also have decidability. This follows by the
standard argument: enumerate all the proofs (which is possible since all the
logics ILX in question are recursively enumerable) and all the (codes of) finite
models simultaneously. Sooner or later, we either find a proof of A, or, because
of the completeness and the FMP, a model of ¬A.
Corollary 7.9. The logics ILM0, ILW
∗, ILP0 and ILR are decidable.
8 Hierarchies and frame conditions
In this final section we will present frame conditions of a new series of principles
in IL(All) as presented in [29]. We shall recall the frame-conditions computed
for this series with respect to regular Veltman semantics. Next, we shall present
the respective frame conditions for the GVS. These novel results are moreover
formalised in the proof assistant Agda and will shortly be available in the master
thesis of Mas Rovira ([57]) written under the direction of Joosten and Mikec.
8.1 A broad series of principles
Let us present here one of two series from [29]. By lack of a better name the
series was called the broad series. To present this series we first define a series
of auxiliary formulas. For any n ≥ 1 we define the schemata Un as follows.
U1 := 3¬(D1  ¬C),
Un+2 := 3((Dn+1 Dn+2) ∧ Un+1).
Now, for n ≥ 0 we define the schemata for the broad series Rn as follows.
R0 := AB → ¬(A ¬C)B ∧2C,
Rn+1 := AB → Un+1 ∧ (Dn+1 A)B ∧2C.
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As an illustration we shall calculate the first four principles.
R0 := AB → ¬(A ¬C)B ∧2C
R1 := AB → 3¬(D1  ¬C) ∧ (D1 A)B ∧2C
R2 := AB → 3[(D1 D2) ∧3¬(D1  ¬C)] ∧ (D2 A)B ∧2C
R3 := AB → 3((D2 D3) ∧3[(D1 D2) ∧3¬(D1  ¬C)]) ∧ (D3 A)
B ∧2C
It is not hard to determine the frame condition for the first couple of prin-
ciples in this series and in Figure 3 we have depicted the first three frame-
conditions. In this section we shall prove that the correspondence proceeds as
expected. Informally, the frame condition for Rn shall be the universal closure
of
xn+1Rxn . . . Rx0Ry0Sx1y1 . . . SxnynSxn+1yn+1Rz ⇒ y0Sx0z. (3)
x1
x0
y0 y1
z
Sx1
Sx0
x2
x1
x0
y0 y1 y2
z
Sx1 Sx2
Sx0
x3
x2
x1
x0
y0 y1 y2 y3
z
Sx1 Sx2 Sx3
Sx0
Figure 3: From left to right, this figure depicts the frame conditions (R0) through
(R2) corresponding to R0 through R2. The reading convention is as always: if
all the un-dashed relations are present as in the picture, then also the dashed
relation should be there.
We shall first recast the frame condition in a recursive fashion. In writing
(3) recursively we shall use those variables that will emphasise the relation with
(3). Of course, free variables can be renamed at the readers liking.
First, we start by introducing a relation Bn that captures the antecedent
of (3). Note that this antecedent says that first there is a chain of points xi
related by R, followed by a chain of points yi related by different S relations.
The relation Bn will be applied to the end-points of both chains where the
condition on the intermediate points is imposed by recursion.
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B0(x1, x0, y0, y1) := x1Rx1Ry0Sx1y1,
Bn+1(xn+2, x0, y0, yn+2) := ∃xn+1, yn+1
(
xn+2Rxn+1 & Bn(xn+1, x0, y0, yn+1)
& yn+1Sxn+2yn+2
)
.
For every n ≥ 0 we can now define the first order frame condition (Rn) as
follows.
(Rn) := ∀xn+1, x0, y0, yn+1
(Bn(xn+1, x0, y0, yn+1)⇒ ∀z (yn+1Rz ⇒ y0Sx0z)).
Sometimes we shall write xn+1Bn[x0, y0] yn+1 conceiving the quaternary re-
lation Bn as a binary relation indexed by the pair x0, y0.
Theorem 8.1. We have F |= (Rn) if and only if F |= Rn, for each Veltman
frame F and n ∈ N.
8.2 Frame conditions for GVS
In this section we present generalised-frame conditions for the above presented
series Ri. We observe that the mere definition of what it means to be a frame
condition of an axiom scheme can be stated in second order logic where an
arbitrary valuation corresponds to an arbitrary subset. Since GVS is second
order in nature, it may raise a question what actually constitutes a natural
frame condition for a principle other than just writing down the definition.
This question is discussed in [57]. The (Rn)gen condition reads as follows:
∀w, x0, . . . , xn−1, y, z,A,B,C,D0, . . . ,Dn−1.
wRxn−1R . . . Rx0RyRz,
(∀u.wRu, u ∈ A⇒ ∃V.uSwV ⊆ B),
(∀u.xn−1Ru ∈ Dn−1 ⇒ ∃V.uSxn−1V ⊆ A),
(∀i ∈ {1 . . . n− 1}∀u.xiRu ∈ Di ⇒ ∃V.uSxiV ⊆ Di+1),
(∀V.zSyV ⇒ V ∩ C 6= 0),
z ∈ D0
⇒ ∃V ⊆ B.xn−1SwV, {w : ∃v ∈ V.vRw} ⊆ C
Lemma 8.2. Let M be a generalised Veltman model, let x be a world and let
n ∈ N. For any i ≤ n we have that if M, x  Ui then there exist some worlds
y, z, x0, . . . , xi such that:
1. xi = x;
2. xiR . . . Rx0RyRz;
3. for all j ≤ i we have that M, xj  Uj;
4. for all j < i we have that M, xj  Dj Dj+1;
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5. for all V we have that if zSyV then V ∩ {w : M, w  C} 6= ∅;
6. M, z  D0.
Proof. By induction on i. For i = 0 we have that x  3¬(D0  ¬C). It follows
that there exists some y such that xRy  ¬(D0¬C) and therefore there exists
some z such that yRz  D0 and for any V , if zSyV , then V ∩{w : M, w  C} 6=
∅. It is clear that all claims are met.
For i + 1 we have that x  3(Di Di+1 ∧ Ui). It follows that there exists
some xi such that xi  DiDi+1 ∧Ui. By the inductive hypothesis there exist
y, z, x0, . . . , xi such that satisfy claims 1 . . . 6. We set xi+1 := x. It is trivial
to observe that by using the inductive hypothesis all conditions are met for
i + 1.
Theorem 8.3. For any generalised Veltman frame F, we have that F satisfies
the (Rn)gen condition if and only if any model based on F forces every instanti-
ation of the Rn principle. In symbols:
F  (Rn)gen if and only if F  Rn
Proof. If n = 0 we refer to section 4.1 or [57] for full details.
For n+ 1 proceed as follows. Suppose first that we have a generalised Velt-
man model and a world w such that w  A  B. Then assume also that
wRx  ((DnA)∧Un). By Lemma 8.2 it follows that there exist y, z, x0, . . . , xn
satisfying 1 . . . 6. For a formula F , define JF K := {x ∈ M : x  F}. Then let
A := JAK, B := JBK, C := JCK and for i ≤ n let Di := JDiK.
It is routine to check that the left part of the (Rn+1)gen holds and thus we
get that there exists some V ⊆ B such that xnSwV and R[V ] ⊆ C. Since V ⊆ B
we have that xn  B and since R[V ] ⊆ C we have xn  2C. Finally, since
xn = x we conclude x  B ∧2C.
Let us now prove the opposite direction. Fix a generalised Veltman frame
F and let a, b, c, d0, . . . , dn be propositional variables and assume F  Rn+1.
Assume that the left part of the implication of (Rn+1)gen holds. Now consider
a model based on F that satisfies the following:
JaK = A, JbK = B, JcK = C, JdiK = Di, for all i ∈ {0 . . . n}
Now one can routinely check that w  A  B and x  ((Dn  A) ∧ Un),
hence there exists U such that xSwU and U  B ∧ 2C. From that we derive
that U ⊆ B and R[U ] ⊆ C.
This proof has been formalised in Agda. Full details can be found in [57].
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